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Recently, New Jersey and Wisconsin eliminated the practice of increasing the AFDC 
benefits of families that bear additional children while on the program.  Policymakers seem 
to accept the notion that added benefits encourage participants to bear more children, 
despite little direct formal evidence.  This paper uses data fiom the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Women to examine the impact of both the level of AFDC benefits and the per 
child increment on births, as well as the effect of benefit policy and childbearing on AFDC 
participation.  Single-equation probit estimates suggest that women on AFDC are no more 
likely than nonparticipants to give birth over the five years following the observation, but 
that those births which do occur are positively associated with incremental AFDC benefits. 
When birth and welfare participation decisions are estimated sequentially in a nested logit 
framework, AFDC benefits are found to be a significant factor in the post-birth 
participation decision, and empirical support emerges for the hypothesis that AFDC 
benefits also encourage additional births.  The estimated parameters are used to simulate 
the impact on participation and births of eliminating incremental benefits for both new 
program entrants and continuing participants.  Even though the specification supports the 
"AFDC  benefits cause births" hypothesis, eliminating the new-birth increment would 
reduce total program costs by less than 3 percent, since both the per dollar effect of 
benefits on births and the per child increments themselves are small. 
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In the past two years, an environment of sluggish economic growth and tight state budgets has 
led to renewed interest in welfare reform, overturning the apparent state and federal consensus on the 
go-slow, human-capital-oriented approach to reducing welfare dependency as represented in the Family 
Support Act of  1988.  Many reformers have centered their proposals around the allegedly detrimental 
effects of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program on family structure.  In 1992, 
legislatures in New Jersey and Wisconsin voted to deny incremental benefits to AFDC recipients who 
bear additional children.'  The Wisconsin law also allows AFDC recipients who marry to retain some 
benefits for a fixed period, even if  their husbands are emp~oyed.~  Proposals introduced but not passed 
into law include paying a one-time $500 bonus to AFDC recipients in  Kansas who agree to be 
implanted with the contraceptive Norplant, and paid childbirth expenses for unwed mothers in 
Wyomjng who agree to put their child up for adoption.  Ten more states have introduced legislation 
linking welfare and Norplant in the past year. 
What is the impetus for this seemingly sudden clamor for welfare reform'?  Fiscal pressures, 
particularly on state budgets, have undoubtedly  played an important role.  Nationwide, the AFDC 
caseload experienced  largely unanticipated growth of 27 percent between  1989 and  1992, 
encompassing 4.8 million families by  late 1992.  Worsening economic prospects for low-skilled 
workers -- not growth in the population of female-headed households -- are primarily responsible for 
'New Jersey does loosen the earned income restrictions on new mothers to offset the lost benefits. 
However, most AFDC recipients are not in the labor force and would doubtless face difficulties re- 
entering it  soon after giving birth.  New Jersey is being sued over "the $64 question" ($64 being the 
previously automatic per child monthly benefit adjustment) as of this writing (Wall Street Journal 
[1994]).  Georgia  and Arkansas have recently joined  New Jersey in this "experiment," and there are 
motions on both the Republican and Democratic sides of the U.S.  Congress to impose similar policies 
nationally. 
'while  men with children and some two-parent families are potentially eligible for AFDC benefits, 
more than 90'~ercent  of  recipient households are headed by  women. 
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early 1980s prompted many states to tighten their eligibility standards, which also aggravated the 
movement into  elfa are.^ 
In  1991, 31 states responded to the dramatic growth in welfare expenses by freezing nominal 
AFDC benefits,  while nine others actually cut them.  Growth in Medicaid program obligations also 
seems to have squeezed AFDC spending.  Not only are health care costs difficult to control, but most 
state obligations to Medicaid are federally mandated but federally unfunded.  Not surprisingly, other 
welfare programs'  funding has fallen since Medicaid's  introduction in  1965.  Figure 1 shows that, on 
average, states have consistently spent about $0.90 to $1.00 per $100 of personal income on all forms 
of welfare over the past  15 years.  The shaded regions illustrate how AFDC (and other welfare) 
spending has shrunk as Medicaid costs have c~imbed.~  On average, states devoted  12.3 percent of total 
expenditures to welfare by  1988, with two-thirds of that going to Medicaid. 
It is little wonder, then, that following the institution of a lenient federal  approval policy in 
1992, many states eagerly came forward with new welfare experiments.  Federal encouragement of 
state-level experimentation has continued even as the current administration plots its own 
comprehensive reform.  Capping benefits regardless of the number of children may be a palatable way 
to limit program  costs, as long as new entrants are aware of the consequences of additional births. 
However, the cost savings from such a policy depend on the share of program costs accounted for by 
per child increments and the propensity of welfare mothers (and other women who may potentially 
enter the program) to bear additional children.  In this paper, I ask not only if there is empirical 
support for the common belief that AFDC policy encourages fertility, but ,dso  whether significant 
3~n  1981, the federal government instituted  a 10 percent charge on states' borrowing from the U.S. 
Treasury to cover their UI  trust funds.  Many states responded  by increasing their base-period  earnings 
requirements, reducing the availability of UI  to part-time  and intermittently employed workers. 
"The findings of Moffitt (1990).support the contention that total state welfare spending is 
remarkably constant over long periods and that states are quick to reduce the AFDC component of. 
welfare spending in  response to new federal programs or mandates. 
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Ourline 
Section I1 describes an economic framework for thinking about the effects of welfare on the 
childbirth decisions of female heads of household.  This necessitates  a discussion of AFDC's potential 
impact on marriage and labor force participation.  In search of a basis for public opinion on welfare, I 
first use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Women (NLSW) to compare the childbearing 
behavior of AFDC recipients and nonrecipients.'  Although many stereotypes about welfare mothers 
are confirmed on a prima facie basis, contrary to public opinion, I find that participants are no more 
likely than nonparticipants to bear children.  This surprising result holds up even after controlling for 
many other characteristics in a regression framework.  However, for AFDC mothers as a group, probit 
models do indicate a statistically significant and positive relationship between incremental benefits and 
births, suggesting that even fewer  children might be bom to them if incremental benefits were reduced 
or eliminated. 
A single-equation approach, however, ignores the fact that increased numbers of children and 
the presence of  very young children normally enhance the likelihood of AFDC participation, 
independent of the benefit policy.  To isolate the effect of incremental benefits on births and 
participation, the subsequent birth and participation decisions of a sample of female heads of 
household from the NLSW are modeled sequentially and are estimated using a nested logit model. 
First, I calculate the optimal  AFDC participation rule as a function of family size, total AFDC 
benefits, and other variables.  I then estimate the optimal birth choice under the assumption that post 
'I  use the words "recipient" and "participant" interchangeably to refer to a person reporting AFDC 
income in a given year.  It is technically possible to participate in AFDC without receiving cash 
payments simply to qualify for Medicaid or other services associated with the program, but these cases 
are not discemable in the data set. 
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AFDC recipients with new births on their future childbearing behavior and continued participation are 
simulated in.  a natural way in this framework, as is the effect on total participation if benefits are 
frozen for each family according to 1978 family size.  In the concluding section, I summarize the 
findings and place them in the context of previous work on fertility and AFDC policy. 
11.  Economic Models of the Family 
Because female-headed households dominate the poierty  population,  an understanding of 
marriage, birth, and work decisions is crucial for poverty  policy.  In this section, I discuss how AFDC 
benefits can affect birth, maniage, and time allocation  choice^.^ 
Children are assumed'to yield direct utility to parents, and children's consumption may also be 
an argument in parents'  utility functions.  While current earnings are obviously affected, the primary 
cost of children is thought to be forgone human capital development (and hence a lower and perhaps 
flatter future wage profile)  by the mother, who presumably devotes more time than the father to 
childrearing, even if married.7  Work on the number and spacing of births focuses on the joint 
determination of fertility and the path of labor market returns, usually holding marital status constant. 
One of the first dynamic empirical treatments of this issue was by Moffitt.(l984), who looked at the 
fertility and labor supply decisions of mamed women over lengthy periods and found support for this 
- 
hypothesized  relationship between lifetime fertility patterns and wage profiles in the NLSW data. 
The free or highly subsidized child care provided  to working AFDC recipients has an ambiguous 
effect on births.  On one hand, it relieves the mother of the worklchild care trade-off, but at the same 
time, it enables human capital investment, which may lead to reduced future births.  The model 
presented  here could potentially be extended to incorporate this feature of policy as well. 
7~n  the Becker (1973,  1974) mamage model, the returns to specialization of the woman in home 
work can be  shown to be decreasing in .the ratio of the wife's  to the husband's wages.  Most women 
presumably em  a lower wage than their husbands do. 
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can support comes from the option of marrying a man with higher earnings.  Economic models of 
maniage are commonly organized  around the principle of comparing utility inside and outside of 
maniage, following Becker (1973,  1974).  Because the utility from a woman's  own low prospective 
labor market earnings is outweighed by the returns to specializing in home work and sharing her 
husband's  income, the standard model predicts stable family relationships for low-wage women, cet. 
par., in the absence of welfare (e.g., Johnson and Skinner [1988]).  Van der Klaauw (1993) estimates a 
dynamic model of marriage and finds empirical support for these predictions.  However, welfare may 
provide ai  acceptable alternative to maniage for low-wage women who do not want to sacrifice the 
enjoyment of children.  Not surprisingly, studies have shown that when their own and potential 
husband's  labor market prospects are poor, very young women tend to have children out of wedlock, 
subsequently supporting the new family with AFDC benefits.  Welfare is also predicted to raise the 
probability of divorce for low-wage women by decreasing the returns to  specialization in maniage and 
raising the level of consumption (both own and children's) attainable alone.  Finally, married women 
who would otherwise choose to remain childless may "insure" against the income risk of divorce by 
having a child, thus guaranteeing contingent AFDC eligibility.  Single women who would -otherwise 
remain childless may also insure against income risk in this way.* 
Welfare policy has implications for the timing of births as well.  Consider, for instance, the 
effect of AFDC on an always-single woman.  The option of welfare participation tends to flatten the 
age-income profile by smoothing downside income fluctuations.  Hence, if  wage profiles take on a 
traditiohal hump shape with respect to age, and if borrowing against future labor earnings is not 
permitted, women can also afford to bear and raise children earlier in life in the presence of welfare. 
&This paper examines only the second or subsequent birth decisions of unmanied women.  Thus, I 
do not address the insurance effect of  AFDC on first births or on births to married women. 
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order to extend wage- or divorce-contingent program eligibility. 
There is one possible source of savings in program costs from encouraging (or failing to 
discourage) births that the economic model described so far does not consider.  Pregnancy potentially 
provides an impetus to marriage for some men and women.  In this regard, it could plausibly play a 
positive role, since half of all program exits are accounted for by  mamage (Hutchens [1981]). 
111.  Characteristics of Female Heads of Household 
The weight of the empirical research on AFDC and family structure-  provides only mixed 
support for the notion that the program significantly affects childbirth  decision^.^  However, public 
opinion strongly favors the theory that AFDC policy has important and detrimental effects on the 
family.  In a New York TimeslCBS news poll conducted in May  1992, most respondents agreed that 
the welfare system encourages people to have larger families.  That attitude is obviously shared and 
reinforced by many elected officials. 
What is the basis for this opinion?  Prima facie evidence from the NLSW confirms many of 
the hypothesized effects of welfare on fertility, and this is one way the public might form its ideas 
about the behavior of  welfare  mother^.'^  The NLSW is a panel data set that follows a group of 
women between the ages of  14 and 24 in  1968.  Information on AFDC  is collected in the 
1978 and  1983 surveys.  Table  1 presents some comparisons of  the family characteristics of  female- 
headed households both on and off welfare in  1978.  The findings reveal that welfare mothers do have 
See Moffitt (1992) and An, Haveman, and Wolfe (1993) for discussions of the literature. 
I  hold family structure constant in the comparison.  However, it is also possible that the general 
public perceives female-headed households negatively, whether the family is on welfare or not:  This 
is a potential  source.of additional stigma for families receiving aid. 
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them at significantly younger ages (AFDC recipients had their first child at around age IS, while  - 
.  . 
nonrecipients on average had their first child about a year later).  The shares of family sizes between 
the two groups are essentially reversed.  While the same proportion of  women in each group have two 
children, 47 percent of AFDC recipients have three or more children, while 44 percent of nonrecipients 
have only'one child.  AFDC recipients are more likely to have never been married and are also less 
likely to many in the five years following the observation.  Studies using other samples suggest that 
recipients tend to be younger women with younger children (e.g.,  Blank [1989]).  This is not reflected 
in the NLSW data (the fraction of  women with children under age six is not significantly different 
across the two groups) due to the age restriction on the sample. 
The age spread between the youngest and oldest child is significantly higher for AFDC 
recipients.  This is consistent with the notion that women who might use welfare may space their 
births farther apart to lengthen contingent eligibility.  However, these figures need to be  broken down 
by  family size, since the spread is definitionally increasing in the number of births.  When this is 
done, the only significant difference between the participating and nonparticipating groups is for 
female heads with three children; in this case, the age spread for nonparticipating families is nearly 
one year longer. 
The final line of  table  1 compares the guarantee across participating and nonparticipating 
groups.  The maximum benefit or guarantee is the2payment  to a zero-earning family of  a given size.  It 
is the highest possible payment to the family, from which are deducted variables such as labor and 
property income, child support, and alimony to anive at the final benefit payment.  The mean values 
are for a family size of  three (one parent and two children).  AFDC participants tend to live in states 
with significantly higher guarantees.  One explanation for this is that more generous benefits induce 
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average  12 percent higher.  The returns to additional children do not vary according to participation 
status and are as follows: 24 percent for the second child,  19 percent for the third,  15 percent for the 
fourth, and  13 percent for the fifth. 
Subsequent Births to 1978 Female Heads  .  . 
For now, let us ignore any "insurance effect" of  welfare benefits, which may manifest itself in 
the nonparticipating portion of female-headed households.  In this case, the effects of policy will be 
evident if there are significant differences between the childbearing characteristics of participants and 
nonparticipants.  If welfare encourages careless contraception or the active creation of additional 
children, one might expect to observe marked differences in the fertility patterns of AFDC participants 
versus nonparticipants.  Because the NLSW does not contain enough detailed participation data to hold 
recipiency status constant over an extended period, I compare the subsequent childbirth experiences of 
participants and nonparticipants as of  1978. 
The first line of table 2 presents the fraction of each group bearing at least one child between 
1978 and  1983 by  1978 participation status --I5 percent of participants and  18 percent of 
nonparticipants.  This difference is statistically insignificant, which might surprise those predisposed to 
think that life on AFDC encourages childbearing, either through direct monetary rewards or by 
indulging a careless lifestyle.  However, it is still possible that of those women who do have children, 
AFDC participants have more.  Though the findings in the next line refute this, it could be that the 
comp'bison is not yet specific enough.  We know that AFDC mothers have more children to begin 
"~n  alternative hypothesis is that high-benefit states are "welfare magnets."  Gramlich and Laren 
(1984) find some support for significant but very small population movements in response to welfare 
policy.  To what extent this can explain the large differences in mean benefits noted here remains an 
open issue. 
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inappropriate to compare the subsequent birth patterns of  women with different family sizes in  1978. 
Lines 4-7 of  table 2 reveal that even after adjusting for initial family size, the AFDC group is no more 
likely to bear an additional child than the rest of the population of  female heads.  In fact, although the 
differences are not statistically significant, the fraction of AFDC mothers giving birth is actually 
smaller than that of nonparticipants at every given initial family size.  This is an intriguing result in 
light of  the rhetoric surrounding welfare mothers and pregnancy.  Finally, nonrecipients tend to be 
older.  Further age restrictions make the difference between the two groups more pronounced, although 
it remains insignificant.  It may be that older women have deliberately delayed conception and thus are 
more likely to give birth over the next five years.  Because there are many other characteristics for 
which one should control, I shift to a regression framework below to investigate this phenomenon 
further. 
To do this, I estimate a probit model with a binary dependent variable that equals one if  a 
birth occurs within the next five years.  The coefficient of interest is on a binary variable for AFDC 
participation in  1978.  It is significant and positive if  participants tend to have more children, all else 
equal.  I maintain the number of children in  1978 and the age of the mother as explanatory variables 
and also add income, education, race, and demographic characteristics thought to affect fertility.  Table 
3 summarizes the findings. 
Twelve variables are included in  the final specification.  Eight are significantly different from 
zero at the  10 percent level or less.  The last column of the table presents the results of  converting the 
coefficients to percentage-point changes.  As expected, the mother's age significantly reduces the 
probability of an additional birth (by 2.3 percentage points per year), while the younger the mother is 
at her first birth, the less likely she is to continue to bear children over the period of  interest. 
Significant variables having large effects on new-birth probability include race (whites are 9 percent 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmless likely to bear-  additional children) and future marital status (those who many are 14 percent more 
likely to bear additional children).''  The initial number of children also significantly influences the 
probability of future births.  Women with four or more children in the home in  1978 are the least 
likely to add to their families, while those with two children are more likely to bear additional children 
than women with only one child.  The coefficients for the presence of  young children, income, and 
education are not significantly different from zero.  Surprisingly, participation significantly reduces the 
probability of  a subsequent birth in this specification.  All else equal,'participants are 6 percent less 
likely to give birth over the next five years than n~nparticipants.'~ 
IV.  An Ad Hoc Test for the Influence of Policy 
while participants.appear to be no more likely than nonparticipants to bear children over the 
subsequent five years, it is plausible that they would experience even fewer births if  incremental 
benefits were unavailable.  As a preliminary test of  this hypothesis, I estimate a probit model identical 
to.the one above, except that 1) the sample is split by  1978 participation status, and 2) the maximum 
benefit'to a zero-earning family (of appropriate size) and the increment to benefits that it receives if  an 
additional birth occurs enter as explanatory variables.  Policy variables are predicted to have little or 
no effect on the fertility behavior of  1978  nonparticipant^.'^  If  children are a "normal good," one 
would expect additional benefits to have a positive effect on births.  Consequently, additional births 
should be more likely in states that offer a higher per child increment. 
'Vheory suggests that future marital status may be endogenous with births. This issue is ignored here. 
13~cs  (1993), working with a group of  14 to 23 year-olds in the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth--Young Women (NLSY), also finds that AFDC recipiency around the time of a first birth has 
little effect on the likelihood of a second birth, suggesting that this result may be robust even for 
teenage mothers. 
'"This crude assumption is relaxed below. 
10 
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age at first birth, and education are insignificant.  Ultimate marital status and the initial number of 
children continue to be significant, as are maximum benefits and the increment to new births.  The 
split between the effects of  base and incremental benefits may be capturing nonlinearities in the birth 
response, which would account for the negative coefficient on base benefits. The predictive power of 
the model (presented in the frequency table and summarized by  a pseudo-R')  is far superior to what is 
essentially the same model excluding the policy variables presented in table 3.  The probit coefficients 
suggest that an additional $10 in base benefits is associated with a 1-percentage-point lower probability 
of  subsequent births, while a $10 increase in the per child increment raises the probability of  an 
additional birth by  6 percentage points.  This suggests that New  Jersey could reduce births to AFDC 
mothers by  25 percent if incremental' benefits were cut an average of  $41.78 ($64 in nominal  1994 
dollars). 
However, there is reason to believe that this estimate is overstated.  Family size, the presence 
of children less than six years of  age, and the AFDC guarantee have been shown to have a positive 
influence on welfare participation across many studies and data sets.  Consequently, new births may be 
associated with higher incremental benefits, not because benefits cause new births, but because both 
the addition to  the family and the higher (final) benefits in a state make AFDC participation more 
attrnctive for given levels of  initial benefits and other factors.  Even the extreme case of random births 
may generate a psitive relationship between incremental benefits and births.  All  else equal, one 
would still expect women facing higher birth increments to be more likely program participants, 
simply because higher birth increments mean higher final family benefits, .yhich have a demonstrated 
positive effect on participation. 
"similar  specifications applied to the  1978 nonparticipating group yield insignificant coefficients 
on  the policy variables. 
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First, the participation decision is incorporated into the estimation subsequent to the birth decision, so 
that family size and children's  age variables are included as explanatory variables in the participation 
stage.  Second, the birth increment may affect the participation decision only after a birth has 
occurred, while having little impact on the birth decision itself.  The sequential structure of the 
estimation leaves open the possibility that this indirect effect of  the guarantee increment on births is 
minimal relative to other factors that both directly and indirectly affect births.  Finally, the nested logit 
specification allows for the possibility that benefits to  1983 participants influence the birth decision 
even if  they did not participate in  1978, and that benefits may influence the birth decisions of those 
who did not participate ex ante or ex post. 
V.  A Sequential Choice Model 
Taking initial status as a single female with one or more children as given in  1978, I estimate 
the probability of  an additional birth and, contingent upon whether the birth occurs, the probability of 
participating in the AFDC program in  1983.  Since policymakers' primary interest is in program 
participants, it will be  interesting to contrast estimates for initial participants and nonparticipants.  If 
those who view welfare as a "way of life" are most responsive to program rules, substantial reductions 
in births and program costs could occur if  additional benefits are denied to current (but not new) 
participants. 
The model estimates can be used to examine the effect of the per child increment on both the 
decision to have an additional child and the decision to participate in AFDC contingent upon an 
additional birth.  Thus, I can address the primary question that  seems to be on lawmakers' minds:  Do 
incremental benefits promote participant fertility'?  I can also assess the impact of  the incremental 
benefit on total program  participation (i.e., both continued and new). 
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The nested logit model is governed by equations for the binary variables "have a child" and 
"participate in.  AFDC."  Let "N" and  "n"  denote these choices.  There are i = 1.2 choices for N (i.e., 
give or do not give birth to an additional child -- or children -- over the period  1978-83) and j = 1,2 
choices for n  (participate in  1983 or not).  The sequential choices form the decision tree illustrated in 
figure 2.  The indirect utility from the final outcome (ij) of  the decision process is specified as 
where Xij  contains variables specific to the (birth-contingent) participation decision, and Yi contains 
variables that determine childbirth but not subsequent decisions.  The random  utility model makes 
explicit the inability of  agents to optimize perfectly, both because in a realistic setting their actions 
cannot yield precisely the theoretically possible utility value, and because changed circumstances may 
lead to changes in  preferences in the future that are unpredictable a priori.  However, the maintained 
assumption is that consumers' underlying behavior is constrained optimization of  perceived expected 
utility.  That is, the observed choice (iJ) corresponds to 
The parameter estimates are obtained by  maximum likelihood using the joint extreme 
value distribution for the cij, which yields a probability for outcome (ij) of  - 
and a conditional probability for participation choice j given birth outcome i of 
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Variables ' 
The binary choice variables are whether a birth occurs over the  1978-83 period and whether 
the agent is a 1983 AFDC participant.  Figure 2 shows the sequence of decisions and the number of 
observations on each decision.  Previous estimates suggest that biological variables have an important 
influence on fertility.  State policy toward abortion and the availability and generosity of  family 
planning or prenatal services have also been cited as important determinants (e.g., Moore and Caldwell 
[I9771 and Lundberg and Plotnick [1990]).  The mother's current age, her age at first birth, the current 
number of children, and the number of  small children in the home are variables that reflect preferences 
about family structure and that indicate the mother's biological ability to bear additional children. 
State policies that affect births include the availability and cost to the mother of  abortion and other 
family planning services, the availability and generosity of'both Medicaid and private health insurance, 
,  and the generosity of the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program.  WIC supplements food 
stamps and has been available to pregnant women in all states but Utah since 1976.  Income and total 
net wealth in  1978 are included in the birth decision because they indicate resources potentially 
available for children's consumption (part of the effect of  1978 AFDC participation on births should 
be transmitted through extremely low resources).  Finally, race, religion, prior marital status, and 
education reflect heterogeneity in childbearing behavior as well as awareness about contraception. 
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welfare participation is the trade-off  between income from welfare and income from the labor market: 
The important variables are the benefit guarantee in the state, the wage that the feinale head can obtain 
in the marketplace, and other income (such as alimony) that is heavily "taxed" by the AFDC program. 
The AFDC guarantee varies by  family size and takes on different values according to which branch of 
the decision tree is chosen in the birth stage.  While the hours worked choice is not explicitly 
modeled, the presence of preschool children, who pose the most significant child care problem, 
depends on the  1978-83 birth decision and is reflected in the relative importance of  the number of 
children across the participation branches.  Variables thought to  be influential at both levels of  choice 
are education and age (reflecting fertility and work experience),.number of  children, race, and 
Medicaid coverage.  Variables thought to affect participation directly are child care policy, prior 
experience with welfare, and the local unemployment rate. 
Estimated Wages 
Wages are an important indicator of  the trade-off between welfare and work.  NLSW 
respondents were asked about wages in their current or previous job during the 1983 interview. 
However, about one-third did not report wages because they had never worked or because they did not 
respond to the question.  In those instances where  1978 wages are reported but  1983 wages are not, 
inflated wages from the earlier year are used.  For the remaining observations that do not report wages 
in either period, wage rates ace imputed from a standard human-capital wage equation. 
'?or.  example, see Moffitt (1983) and Blank (1985). 
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Estimates of the effects of personal characteristics and policy variables on births and 
participation are obtained from the nested logit model.  Mechanically, this amounts to estimating a 
discietechoice model for 1983 participation (with the coefficients of the conditional choices 
constrained to be equal), constructing an "inclusive value" from the fitted results, and estimating a 
discrete choice model for 1978-83 births with the inclusive value as an additional explanatory variable. 
Standard errors are corrected for the fact that the inclusive value is estimated."  All dollar figures are 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index. 
The top panel of  table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of the welfare participation problem 
given the birth choice.  Only four of  the 10 included variables are significant at the 5 percent level or 
more, but each has the anticipated effect on participation.  Larger benefits and more children lead to a 
greater likelihood of participation, while higher wages make work more attractive and reduce the 
chances of  participation.  The local unemployment rate is significant at the  10 percent level and 
increases the value of participation by  reducing the return to being in the labor market.  Coefficients 
on age, non-labor income, education, race, and a constant are not significant in the discrete choice 
model for participation. 
Future marital status is an important determinant of participation status, since married women 
are effectively removed from the prospective AFDC population.  Ideally, one would like to incorporate 
-  maniage as an endogenous choice, but the smple is too small for this to be feasible.  Instead, it enters 
as a highly significant explanatory variable in the participation model.  To investigate the possible bias 
introduced in  the coefficients by the inclusion of  1983 marital status, I reran the participation phase of 
the model without this variable (the results are not reported).  The only coefficient that changed 
 he multinomial logit model is obtained by  restricting the coefficient on the inclusive value to 
one. 
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future marital status is excluded, indicating that it is mostly whites exiting the eligible population 
through marriage.  All  of the second-stage estimation is based on the specification with maniage. 
The second part of table 5 reports the findings of the birth choice estimation.  Policy variables 
in the birth stage include the value of  WIC benefits and family planning services, Medicaid 
expenditures, and an index of  state abortion policy.  Because women who are in the AFDC program  - 
. 
may have more ready access to or may be more comfortable using other public programs, WIC 
benefits and family planning services are also interacted with  1978 AFDC participation, although WIC 
and family planning are not strictly governed by  income and asset tests, as the larger programs are. 
One would expect higher WIC benefits to increase births, while the availability of family planning 
should increase the value of the "no birth" choice by  subsidizing the effort and expense of 
contraception.  State-averaged Medicaid benefits for one woman and one child are interacted with 
AFDC participation, since this is the primary method of  access to Medicaid.  Medicaid provides 
abortion services and covers  pre- and postnatal care, so the overall effect on births is ambigu~us.'~ 
However, I find that none of these policy variables has a significant influence on births. 
In contrast to the findings of the simple birth probits in tables 3 and 4, the mother's age at 
first birth, initial number of children, and prior marital status are insignificant in  the nested logit 
specification.  Income and education are strongly significant, while they were not in the earlier single- 
equation specifications, suggesting that the nested logit model gives more credit to economic, rather 
than biological, circumstances at the time of the birth decision.  In  fact, total resource variables (1978 
income and total net wealth) are the most influential of  all, implying that current AFDC participants 
are less likely to have additional children because they are at  the bonom of the income and wealth 
181 attempt to separate these effects by  interacting the Medicaid variable with both the 
restrictiveness and continuity variables for abortion policy.  None of  the interactions is significantly 
different from zero.  The findings are not reported. 
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Consistent with earlier findings, the mother's current age significantly reduces the probability 
of another birth.  Nonwhites are more likely to give birth over the next five years.  For 1978, AFDC 
participation was entered directly in some specifications of the birth choice (not reported), but as 
before, did not positively influence births.  Finally, the inclusive value camed over from the 
participation stage significantly and positively affects the birth decision and is significantly different 
from one, supporting the nested over the multinomial logit specification.  In combination with the 
findings from the first stage, this implies that increased AFDC benefits result in a significantly higher 
unconditional probability of a birth.  I now proceed to investigate the magnitude of this effect. 
Simulations 
To be clear about the simulation exercise below, it is worth spelling out the role of AFDC 
benefits in the model explicitly.  Letting Uij  denote the utility from the outcome of birth choice i and 
participation choice j, we have 
where No is the initial number of children, K is the change in the number of children between  1978 
and 1983, G(N) is the AFDC guarantee for a family of one adult plus N children, E is autonomous 
income, and X,j and Yi are as defined above.  Thus, the first term, for example, specifies utility from 
the decisions to have a child and participate in welfare as a function of the welfare guarantee for a 
family of size "No + K" and the other choice-specific variables. 
The specific policy changes in New  Jersey and  Wisconsin disallow incremental benefits for 
births occurring while the mother is on AFDC.  Presumably, those entering the program still face 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmguarantees that vary by  family size.  If G(No) denotes the maximum benefit to a family of  size No, this 
policy change can be simulated by setting G(No+K) = G(No) for all K in the lower branches of the 
decision tree for current (1978) participants, but not for 1978 nonparticipants.  From  the new implied 
probabilities ofparticipation, the number of  1978 participants changing their birth choice can be 
inferred. 
The proposed policy change affects participation rates in two ways.  First, the probability of 
participation conditional upon giving birth is reduced because welfare benefits are now  lower, 
dropping  1.8 percentage points on average and 2.5 percentage points for previous participants (see 
table 6).  Second, the probability of giving birth is indirectly reduced by the adverse policy change, 
falling 1.5 percentage points on average and 2.3 percentage points for previous participants.  However, 
participation increases through another channel:  While participation probabilities conditional upon no 
birth are unaffected by  the new policy, unconditional b!rth  probabilities must rise.19  Therefore, the 
joint probability of observing participation without a birth rises above that of  the base case, up 0.3 
percentage point for the entire sample and 0.7 percentage point for the previously participating 
subgroup.  The net effect of  the policy change is that the  1983 participation rate drops by  only a very 
small amount: 0.4 percentage point for the entire sample (from 2 1.9 percent to 2 1.5  percent) and 0.7 
for the subsample of  1978 participants (from 34.7 percent to 34.0 percent). 
The above estimates can be combined with benefit information to provide some idea of the 
total cost savings of denying incremental benefits to participants alone.  Given actual  1983 
participation data, the average monthly benefit cost is $322 per participant.  For the subgroup who 
participate in both  1978 and  1983, comprising 71 percent of  the  1983 participant group, the average 
cost is slightly higher ($340), accounting for 75 percent of  total costs.  If the policy change does 
-'g~ntuitively,  many of  those who are discouraged by  the policy change from having a child will 
nevertheless participate in AFDC. 
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reduced  by  $9.65 per month, or 2.8 percent."  For the group of  1978 participants, the total expected 
participation rate drops from 34.7 to 34.0 percent, implying at most a 3.5 percent (= 2.8  + 0.7)  cost 
reduction for the previously participating group ($1 1.90 per person), or a 2.6  percent (= 0.75 x 3.5)  . 
reduction in total costs.  Hence, although the empirical findings support a significant effect of policy 
on births, it does not seem possible to generate large cost savings from the proposed policy change, 
simply because the relative size of incremental benefits and the propensity of  AFDC participants to 
give birth are both quite small. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
This paper finds support for the notion that birth decisions respond to welfare program 
incentives, but the magnitude of the response is modest.  At  least among mature (i.e.,  24 to 34 year-. 
olds in  1978) mothers, the potential cost savings of denying birth increments are small, both because 
relatively few welfare mothers give birth (at least in this sample) and because although benefits 
significantly and positively affect participation, birth increments are not of  sufficient magnitude to 
discourage participation by much.  In fact, denying incremental benefits to AFDC recipients who bear 
more children while on the program would save just  $1 1.90 per month per continuing participant 
under the  1983 benefit schedule, or 2.62 percent of their average payment.  If  the maximum benefit 
were frozen for all female heads at the  1978 family size, total participation would be reduced by less 
than half of  1 percent.  In the remainder of this section,. I compare my findings with the related 
literature. 
'%is  is less than the average per child increment because the cost savings are obtained only for 
those actually giving birth, and very few 1978 participants give birth by  1983. 
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Acs (1993), using a sample of  women between the ages of  14 and  16 in  1979 from the NLSY, 
concludes that there is little support for the hypothesis that incremental benefits encourage births 
among female heads of household.  Acs examines first and second births occurring by  age 23 using 
the single-equation hazard approach of Plotnick (1990).  The welfare participation decision is not 
explicitly modeled, and the particular empirical specifications are similar to the model reported in table 
4."  Acs'  policy variables are the maximum benefit for a family of two and the "AFDC gap" between 
family sizes of  two and three.  His findings on the effect of  policy variables are overall quite similar 
to mine, but he dismisses significant results for some groups as an artifact of the omission of  the 
separate influence of children on participation.  This paper goes further to demonstrate that benefit 
policy has an independent and significant effect on births, but that findings from the single-equation 
approach are grossly overstated due to a type of  simultaneous-equations bias. 
In contrast with the results of Lundberg and Plotnick (1990), I find little evidence that policies 
such as WIC benefits, family planning, and state abortion laws influence fertility.  However, 
Lundberg and Plotnick's data set (the NLSY)  allows them to  implement a more specific test:  They 
have sufficient data to model conception and birth decisions separately.  It is possible that realized 
births are not sufficiently informative to test the effects of  these policies.  Lundberg and Plotnick 
(1990) also examine younger women, who presumably have more to learn about family planning.  It 
may be that the mature women in the NLSW  sample have  little knowledge to gain from state- 
sponsored programs, and hence these programs are of little relevance for their birth decisions. 
In recent work, Murray (1994) revisits the basic time series evidence on welfare policy and 
illegitimate births.  He suggests that while the number of  births per (black) woman has been falling 
''~echnically,  the primary difference is that  Acs  estimates a logit specification with corrections for 
censored observations. 
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all births has been following increases in welfare generosity with a two-year lag.  The results of  my - 
analysis are typical of  the type that frustrate Murray about cross-sectional studies:  Policy effects are 
found to be significant but minuscule.  While the finding that single welfare mothers are no more 
likely to bear additional children than their nonparticipating counterparts seems to ,support earlier 
evidence that the illegitimacy rate has not been driven by  welfare policy, plausible competing 
hypotheses are that the sample is from a period when the "culture of  poverty" had seeped into the non- 
welfare-participating groups, or that female-headed households are culturally quite similar, regardless 
of  whether they participate in welfare. 
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Policy variables are culled from various sources, including Bush (1983), Gold (1982), Sollom 
(1994), Torres, Forrest, and Eisman (1981), Torres and Forrest (1983). and several government 
agencies. 
ABLAW:  An overall score of  the restrictiveness of state law with regard to abortions.  A point is 
added if  1) abortions became legal only after 1969, 2) parental consent or notification is required, or 
3) second-trimester abortions must be performed in a hospital.  A higher score reflects a more 
restrictive policy, which may discourage women from seeking abortion services. 
HYDE80:  The Hyde amendment, passed in  1977, virtually eliminated the federal role in providing 
subsidized abortion services for women on Medicaid.  During  1980, the amendment was temporarily 
suspended by  court order.  The dummy variable HYDE80 is zero if states continued to provide 
funding for Medicaid abortions when the amendment was in force during  1980-81.  This variable 
should capture both the acceptability of abortion in the state (i.e., a willingness to continue to provide 
the same level of service offered by  the federal government before  1977) and any strong 
discontinuities in abortion funding over the periods before, during, and after the amendment's 
suspension. 
FP79:  Title IX provides federal funds for family planning.  While low-income women are its primary 
target, anyone can receive services.  The expected value of  family planning services is defined 9  the 
percentage of  "at-risk" low-income women served by family planning services in a state times an 
estimate of  per patient expenditure.  An  at-risk woman is sexually active.  Total expenditures are 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdivided by  the sum of at-risk low-income women plus teens served.  The denominator excludes 
higher-income women served, which may lead to a. slight overstatement of per patient expenditure. 
(Note that since funds come from federal sources, state-level variation arises from different 
probabilities of participation, which may in part reflect the state's ability to distribute aid efficiently.) 
WIC78:  The Women, Infants, and Children's program provides food to pregnant and nursing mothers. 
Monthly data on participation and food expenditures by state are averaged over the year.  Average 
monthly food expenditures are divided by  the average monthly number of participants to arrive at a 
per-recipient food expenditure amount.  Data are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1979). 
MEDIC78 and MEDIC83:  variables on statewide Medicaid expenditures per AFDC adult and child 
are from the Joint Tax Committee "Green Book" (various editions).  These are combined to yield 
expected values of Medicaid for AFDC families of various sizes. 
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a  b  c 
Participant  Nonparticipant  t-statistic 
4 
Number of children  2.62  1.95  6.74 
4 
Fraction with one child  0.24  0.44  )  5.08 
Fraction with  two children  0.30  0.32  0.52 
4 
Fraction  with he  children  0.24  0.13  3.57 
4 
Fraction with four+ children  0.23  0.11  4.15 
Mother's age  28.46  28.74  (N=435)  1.14 
hlother's age at first birth 
Fraction  with children under six 
Age of  youngest child 




Spread4 or more children 
Pcmenl of  mothera who are while 
Fraction never married 
Fraction  marrying, 1978-83 
AFDC participant. 1983  0.40  0.09 
4 
9.94 
267.62  Maximum benefit. two children  238.78  2.53 
a  N=217 except where otherwise noted 
b  N=442 except where otherwise noted 
o  1-test for equality of  mean, of  samples are drawn from two populations with the same  variance,  t .m,  = 1.96. 
Exocedr t for difference at 5 percent d~dence  level. 
Souroc:  Author's comp~itations  from the NLSW. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  Probit Estimates of Births Using AFDC  Participation as an Explanatory Variablea 
Variable  Coefficient  Probability Change  Mean (x)  Std. Dev. (x) 
Children 1.t. 6' 
Married by  1  983C 




Not high school graduateC 
High school graduateC 
Children: 
One child, 1978' 
Two children, 1 978c 
Four children, 1  978C 
AFM=  participant, 1978' 
a  Sample of 640 women who are heads of household in  1978. 
* 
b  -  t 025 a, -  1.96. t 05,m = 1.645. 
Bin&  variable equal to one if statement is true for household. 
Source: Author's computations fiom the NLSW. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4:  Probit Estimates of Births Using AFDC Benefits as an Explanatory Variablea 
Variable  Coefficient  Probability Change  Mean (x)  Std. Dev. (x) 
WhiteC 
Children 1.t. 6' 
Married by  1983' 
Mother's age at first birth 
1  978 income 
Education: 
Not high school graduateC 
High school graduateC 
Children: 
One child, 1  97SC 
Two children, 1 97SC 
Four children, 1  97SC 
AFDC  benefit, 1978 
Incremental benefit, 1978  3.74E-02  6.09E-03  56.71  22.08 
(2.57) 
a  Sample of 134 state-matched, AFDC-participating female household heads in  1978. 
b  tQ2s  a = 1.96, tos,a  = 1.645. 
BI~&  variable equal to one if statement Is true for household. 
source:-~uthor's  computations fiom the NLSW. 











Number of children a 
(continued) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm.  Table .5:  Continued 
Births 
Constant 





Age @ first birth 
Number of children 




Abortion law index 
Inclusive value C*d 
a  Variable affects participation. 
b  Variable affects nonparticipation. 
c  Variable affects birth. 
d  Variable affects no birth. 
e Family planning and WIC are combined into a single variable. 
Source: Author's computations &om the NLSW. 
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Sample  Subsample of 1978 AFDC  Participants 
Status Quo 
New Policy:  No Incremental Benefits for New Births 
0.170  =  0.208  *  0.819  0.272  =  0.332  *  0.822 
a B=bi. 
b  P=participant. 
c  NB=no birth. 
Source:  Author's computations fiom the NLSW. 
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